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Abstract: 
The compensation and incentive systems of executive directors have 
been the subject of particular attention by scholars and regulators for their sig-
nificant implications on an economic and social level. Especially in the after-
math of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007, compensation practices based on 
short-term profits were accused of having significantly increased the risk-tak-
ing that threatened the global financial system. In order to avoid this repercus-
sion, the European Community and Italian regulators issued instruments for 
encouraging banks to implement remuneration systems complying more with 
their operational and dimensional characteristics. The last of these rules in the 
Italian legal framework was the VII Update of “Circolare N° 285 of 17th De-
cember 2013” which examines the new rules about the remuneration of bank-
ers and executives in the Italian financial sector, and the impact of these rules 
on the three Italian larger significant banks. Results show that the three Italian 
banks have not been strongly impacted by these rules. Since 2013, in fact, the 
remuneration system of the three banking groups examined were characterized 
by a proper balancing between the fixed and the variable component of remu-
neration, as well as by a binding (ex-ante and ex-post) adjusting system. 
Above all, the new rules have affected the number of the “material risk-tak-
ers”, which increased in 2015. 
 
Keywords: remuneration; CRD IV (EU Capital Requirements Directive); Sin-
gle Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); golden parachutes; Circolare N° 
                                                          
1 University of Rome 3 and Bank of Italy. The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn are 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect neither the views of Bank of Italy, nor those 
of the other mentioned Institutions.  
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285/2013, Bank of Italy. 
 
Introduction and research objectives 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007, the compensation and incen-
tive systems policies and practices in banks and banking groups have been 
subject to special attention, not only by international bodies and regulators but 
also by scholars and by public opinion, due to the considerable implications 
of these matters at economic and social level (De Poli, 2013). 
In fact the crisis brought to light the deficiencies existing in Corporate 
Governance systems and in a particular way in the policies and forms of re-
munerating management, which often turned out to be unsuitable and a deter-
mining factor in excessive assumption of risks on the part of intermediaries 
(Furlan, Cremascoli, Paglionico, 2011; Vitali, Miramondi, 2014). 
The unsuitability of remuneration systems in the financial sector de-
rives chiefly from the structure of such systems, from the adoption of “inap-
propriate” incentivizing mechanisms and from the amount, in absolute value, 
of the remunerations paid (Nigro, 2014). 
For this reason, both US and EU regulators have been concerned to 
introduce restrictions on the amounts and timing of cash rewards granted to 
bank management and employees, on the assumption that these may be based 
in on “illusionary” profit (Livne, Markarian and Milne, 2011). 
In particular, in 2014, on the proposal of the European Banking Au-
thority (EBA), the European Union issued the new Regulatory Technical 
Standards (RTS). The RTS refers to suitable qualitative and quantitative cri-
teria for identifying the category of personnel whose professional activities 
have a substantial impact on the risk profile of the body (Material Risk Tak-
ers). This boundary line takes on particular importance as it identifies the per-
sons primarily subject to the abovementioned restrictions and deferral clauses. 
Subsequently, on 18th November 2014, the Bank of Italy, in application 
of the Directive 2013/36/EU (so-called CRD IV), issued the VII Updating of 
Circolare N° 285 of 17th December 2013, indexed as “Politiche e prassi di 
remunerazione e incentivazione” (hereinafter for brevity, “Provision”).  
This Provision clarifies certain aspects of the previous regulations and 
renders them coherent with the new rules on the subject of company govern-
ance (a theme closely linked to the discipline of compensations) and with the 
recent coming into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM2 
                                                          
2 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (or SSM) was instituted in accordance with EU Regu-
lation N° 1024/2013 which concentrates under the ECB specific duties regarding prudential 
supervision of credit institutions. The constitution of the SSM is of fundamental importance 
to the constitution of the Banking Union. It ensures “that the Union’s policy on prudential 
supervision of credit institutions is implemented coherently and efficiently, that the single 
corpus of regulations on financial services is applied in the same way to credit institutions in 
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(Bentivegna, 2016). Moreover, it inserts important innovations with regard to 
the former approach to the matter. In fact, the Provision intervenes in fields 
formerly left to the private autonomy of the subjects supervised. By imposing 
significant prudential overseeing, it mitigates the need for a better, long term 
and risk sensitive alignment, between remunerations and company perfor-
mances. 
In a special way the new rules, though sharing the substantial baselines 
of the previous ones3, intervene in certain aspects such as: (i) the role of the 
meeting, which under several profiles is extended and valorised; (ii) the struc-
ture of remuneration, with the setting of a cap to the incidence of the variable 
proportion of remuneration with regard to the fixed one, and the clarification 
of several profiles concerning the composition of the variable component of 
remuneration; (iii) the mechanisms of ex-post corrections of variable compen-
sations (“malus” and “clawback”) rendered more incisive and anchored to 
conditions also linked to the “quality” of the beneficiary’s conduct; (iv) the 
proportion of remuneration regarding the final moment of the work relation-
ship, or the moment successive to it (so-called “golden parachutes” and dis-
cretional pension benefits) which must be connected with company perfor-
mances, subject to the period of deferral, and to the abovementioned malus 
and clawback clauses. 
Setting itself in the context of the studies of Agency Theory, the pur-
pose of this work is to carry out a first analysis of the regulations and their 
repercussions on the choices made by some large Italian banking groups on 
the subject of remuneration. 
Given the foregoing, the paper originates from two fundamental re-
search objectives: 
O1)  to analyse the regulatory innovations brought by recent provisions on 
the subject of Remuneration; 
O2)  to verify how these regulations were received by certain large Italian 
banks, with special emphasis on research into any intervening altera-
tions in their remuneration systems (the sample is represented by the 
three main Italian banking groups, classified in function of the total 
assets of their balance). 
As the operating and regulatory environment in which banks compete 
changes, the incentives provided to the management changes as well (Becher 
                                                          
all the member States involved and that these credit institutions undergo optimal supervision 
under a qualitative profile, free from considerations extraneous to the prudential viewpoint” 
(Art. 12 of COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) N. 1024/2013). 
3 It is pointed out among other things that Provision B.I. of 30th March 2011 regarding the 
policies and practices of remuneration and incentivizing in banks and banking groups largely 
confirmed, in turn, the principles and criteria contained since 2008 in the provisions issued by 
the Bank of Italy itself. 
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D. A., Campbell II T. L., Frye M. B, 2005) and consequently their remunera-
tions; and as this environment underwent significant modifications immedi-
ately after the crisis of 2009 with the adoption of the Commission Recommen-
dation of 30 April 20094, the following hypothesis was therefore formulated:  
H1) the regulations do not modify, except marginally, the banks’ remuner-
ation and incentivizing systems. 
This established, it is at once appropriate to underline that the work has 
certain limitations, yet these may be overcome with subsequent research de-
velopments. 
The first limitation is connected with the size of the sample employed 
for the empirical analysis, which is represented by only the three leading Ital-
ian banks in terms of total assets in their balance. On the other hand, notwith-
standing the thirteenth investigation into the major international banks, carried 
out by Mediobanca for the year 2016, considers only the two major banks (In-
tesa San Paolo and Unicredit) as representative of the Italian situation. 
The second limitation is to be found in the timespan considered for the 
empirical analysis (2013 and 2015). 
Lastly, the third limitation is linked to the lack, at least in this introduc-
tory research phase, of comparisons at European and international level.  
 
Conceptual framework and existing literature 
The vast field of national and international economics literature has 
always been interested in decisions on the subject of remuneration policies 
(among others, Murphy, 1985; Sloan, 1993; Hubbard, Palia, 1995; Demsetz, 
Villalonga, 2001; Duffhues, Kabir, 2008; Shlomo, Wolfgang Eggert, Nguyen, 
2013) to the extent that this academic prolusion very soon became the gauge 
of the “best practices” current from time to time, going on to become the con-
ceptual architecture of the various important regulatory interventions. 
The historical conceptual approach to decisions in matters of remuner-
ation policies, which elicited regulatory interventions that were streamlined 
and rich in references to operational praxis and best practices, stood as a sin-
gular and exemplary element of the more encompassing theoretical thread of 
“agency reports”. In any kind of business, in fact, the non-correspondence be-
tween the “natural person-shareholder” and the “natural person-manager” (an 
element typical of the Anglo-Saxon market, less for the central-European mar-
ket) generates the so-called “conflict between principal (i.e. the shareholder) 
and agent (i.e. the manager or head of the business)”; there reigns therefore a 
                                                          
4 This Commission Recommendation intended to complement Recommendations 
2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of 
listed companies. 
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natural relationship of delegation between the one who grants (the share-
holder) and the one who manages (with the aim of maximizing profits drawn) 
the company assets (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen, Meckling, 1976, 
Holmstrom, 1979). Hence the need to intervene, also through the policies and 
practices of remuneration, to favour realignment between the interests of those 
who bring capital and those who manage and positively exploit it (Bebchuk, 
Fried, 2004; Ferrarini, Ungureanu, 2014). 
In fact, by favouring the monitoring of managers’ actions, remunera-
tions represent (at least theoretically) an instrument of containment of agency 
costs, inasmuch as they favour the convergence of the interests of management 
and those, conflicting, of the owners, towards the same objective of creating 
sustainable economic value over time (Intonti, 2011). Contrarily, when the in-
centives system is not suitably linked to performances, not only does one cre-
ate the premises for a divergence of interests between management and owner. 
Moreover, the company also runs the risk of losing human resources of high 
professionalism, since these people will be incentivized to seek other compa-
nies that value their skills (Fama, 1980; Lambert, Larker, 1985; Murphy, 1999; 
Core et al., 1999, 2001; Bebchuk, Fried, 2003).  
The extension of profit-sharing to the manager would realign his inter-
ests with those of his “principal”, however it would remove the distinction of 
being the bearer of the “ontological risk” of the business; so it is necessary to 
provide, side by side with the component of the manager’s physiological fixed 
remuneration, also for a proportion of variable remuneration correlated with 
the results he achieves. 
This traditional conflict between shareholders, managers and adminis-
trators happens not only in industrial enterprises but also in banks which, like 
any other kind of business, may be subject to misalignments of incentives 
among the various players, to weaknesses in internal control systems, incom-
petence and fraud. Moreover there may emerge specific problems linked to 
the very nature of banking, such as subjection to a strong political influence 
(Becht, Bolton, Röell, 2011). 
So far a fairly clear logical scheme but, as experienced during the years 
of the financial crisis, also harbinger of an even graver re-proposition of the 
conflict of interest inherent to the agency contract. In fact the shareholder is, 
by definition, the ontological bearer (as long as the share of capital is main-
tained, even if at the moment of alienation he actualizes expected flows and 
risks) of the company risk; whereas the manager can get out by cancelling his 
contract and the administrator can do so by discontinuance of his office. So, 
an excessive correlation of top staff’s remuneration with the business trend of 
the company could be the harbinger of a management attitude characterized 
by the carrying out of company operations that bring in great profits (and 
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therefore great risks) in the short term, and entail great costs (that is, manifes-
tation of the abovementioned risks) in the longer term. This conceptual ele-
ment manifested itself during the financial crisis where the phenomenon of 
“short termism”, associated with an increase in operations of securitization 
(originate-to-distribute model), contributed to conflict of interests between 
owners and management, as well as between management and the rest of the 
stakeholders (and in this the remuneration and incentive systems then in place 
also played a part, though not as sole and preponderant elements) (Laverty, 
1996; Dallas, 2011). Within this context lie the regulatory interventions, at 
various levels, aiming at facing the contrasting needs: 
(i) to safeguard the freedom of economic initiative (for example how and 
how much to pay one’s employees and management) with regard to 
the necessity of a response to distortive phenomena linked to the rules 
(and practices) in force on the subject of remuneration policies (i.e. 
excessive bonuses in the past);  
(ii) to favour alignment of owner and management interests with regard to 
the obligation, under penalty of an even more destabilizing re-propo-
sition of the abovementioned conflicts of interest, to arrest phenomena 
such as the focalization on policies of maximizing profits in the short 
term (short termism) or the dimensional growth of volumes of proceeds 
not followed by a growth in productivity (empire building) and the dis-
bursement of exorbitant severance payments (golden parachutes) 
(Kanniainen, 2000; Choi, 2004; Bolton, Scheinkman, Xiong, 2006; 
Hope, Thomas, 2008). 
 
Regulatory framework and reference principles 
Prior to beginning a description of the Provision it should be under-
scored that it has envisaged a transitory system (phase-in) over the early years 
of implementing the regulation. Moreover, it has envisaged the graduation of 
application of the rules (proportionality principle) on the basis of characteris-
tics, dimensions, riskiness and operational complexity of each intermediary. 
In this section we shall instead describe the regulation in its full adoption and 
in the panorama of the most important intermediaries (i.e. classified as “Sig-
nificant Institutions" for the purposes of the Single Supervisory Mechanism or 
SSM)5. 
                                                          
5 The theme of proportionality is one of the fundamental elements in the debate on banking 
vigilance. In brief, we may say that the Provision: (i) disapplies the regulations concerning for 
example the “deferral” and the “balancing” of variable remuneration between liquid funds and 
financial instruments (for intermediaries of smaller size, meaning the so-called Less Signifi-
cant institutions in terms of SSM classification and with less than €3.5 billion on the assets 
side of the balance sheet; (ii) applies halved percentages to the above regulations (for the so-
called intermediate banks, meaning Less Significant with assets greater than €3.5 billion).  
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The first principle that leaps to the eye on an initial reading of the pro-
vision is the analytical definition of the duties of the various company organs 
on the subject of company “remuneration policies”.  
At Heading IV, Chapter 2, Section II – Role and Responsibilities of the 
meeting and the company organs, the Provision in fact lays down that the or-
dinary meeting, as well as establishing the compensations of the organs nom-
inated thereby, also approves: 
(i) remuneration and incentivizing policies in favour of members of the 
organs with functions of strategic supervision, management and con-
trol, and of the remaining personnel; 
(ii) remuneration plans based on financial instruments (e.g. stock options 
and stock grants); 
(iii) the criteria for determination of compensation to be agreed upon in the 
case of early conclusion of the mandate or early withdrawal from of-
fice, including the limits fixed for this compensation in terms of yearly 
income of fixed remuneration and maximum amount deriving from 
their application (golden parachutes). 
At present, therefore, while the organ with functions of strategic super-
vision (the administrative body) is assigned the task of drawing up, submitting 
(ex-ante) and monitoring (ex-post) the remuneration policies6, decisional 
power in the matter is assigned to the Shareholders’ Meeting. This organism, 
normally outside the assumption of management-body decisions and in line 
with the sought-after principle of separateness and impartiality of ownership 
with regard to management, now has a considerably extended and valorised 
role within the company in comparison with the previous regulations. In fact, 
its competences have been widened to the point of being able to raise the max-
imum limit (the cap) of the variable proportion of remuneration fixed by the 
same regulations. 
Under a subjective profile the Provision instead reaffirms the distinc-
tion between prescriptions applicable to all personnel and those of greater rig-
our applicable to more relevant personnel (“material risk takers”), meaning 
“all members of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on 
the institution's risk profile” (Regulations 604/2014/EU)7. The rule defines the 
                                                          
6 On this matter an important role is played in the regulation by the internal Board “Remuner-
ation Committee”. The Committee (i) expresses an opinion on the achievement of perfor-
mance objectives, (ii) puts the various remuneration plans to the Board; (iii) supervises correct 
application of the rules and internal policies on the subject. 
7 As regard the criteria employed to assess whether the influence of the professional activities 
of personnel with risk profile is substantial, Regulations 604/2014 establish that they “should 
take account of the potential impact of personnel on the body’s risk profile on the basis of 
powers and responsibilities conferred on them, as well as of the risk and performance indica-
tors of the body itself. Internal organization of the body, and the nature, range and complexity 
of its activities, should be taken into consideration in the assessment. The criteria must fully 
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parameters with which to identify the category of exponents, according to an 
assessment referred to the motivated decision of the individual body: the re-
lated parameters however are not directly indicated; the Prescriptions make 
reference to indices, both qualitative (unalterable and linked to the hierarchical 
position of the person concerned) and quantitative (under certain conditions 
not binding, and based on the level of remuneration received) dictated by the 
EBA (Bentivegna, 2016). 
Moreover, in accordance with the section III – Structure of Systems of 
Remuneration and Incentivizing – that establishes that “the entire remunera-
tion is divided between the fixed and variable components”, and that the rela-
tionship between the two components “must be appropriately balanced, pre-
cisely determined and carefully evaluated in relation to the characteristics of 
the bank and of the different categories of personnel”, the innovative element 
which is perhaps most controversial and disruptive concerns, in agreement 
with what is expressed in CRD 4, the introduction of a cap to the incidence of 
the variable remuneration proportion. This cap is expressed in relative terms 
with regard to fixed remuneration, equal to 100% (in fact no member of the 
company organs, neither manager nor company employee, may receive a bo-
nus greater than their fixed remuneration). There may be exceptions to this 
limit only under the following conditions:  
(i) that the faculty of exception is contained in the Statute (so the favour-
able opinion of the Extraordinary Meeting is required); 
(ii) that the effective exception is approved by the Ordinary Meeting (here 
is the volitional power of the Meeting alluded to above); 
(iii) that in any case the relationship between fixed and variable remunera-
tion remains within the “reinforced cap” of 200%.  
The innovation is fairly disruptive compared with the previous regula-
tory system which, instead, was limited to fixing the more general principle, 
in any case maintained for non-relevant personnel, of “appropriate balancing” 
between fixed and variable components.  
So for the first time a change of direction is formalized with regard to 
the need for alignment between shareholder’s interests and manager’s remu-
neration, as alluded to previously. The provision then tends towards a limita-
tion of variable remuneration, favouring de facto a system which is scarcely 
incentivizing (but precisely for this reason, with less risk appetite) (Becht, Bol-
                                                          
reflect all the risks to which the body or group is or may be exposed. This should furthermore 
permit the bodies to provide for, in their remuneration policy, suitable incentives to ensure 
prudent behaviour on the part of personnel, and should guarantee that identification of per-
sonnel whose professional activities have a substantial impact on the body’s risk profile re-
flects the risk level of the various activities within the body.” 
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ton, Röell, 2011), and which thus stands to protect the suitability of compen-
sation, in fact countering a notable tendency to assign variable emoluments in 
a measure often disproportionate to the total (Ferrarini, Ungureanu, 2014). 
With reference to the variable proportion of remuneration, the compe-
tent company organs” are responsible for choosing the remuneration formula, 
the amount and the incentivizing scheme most appropriate to its needs. But, 
the Provision is concerned that this component should effectively be: (i) cor-
related to company results; (ii) risk sensitive, also in the medium term. And 
hence the formalization of a series of forecasts in this sense. 
Variable remuneration must be first and foremost sustainable under the 
financial and assets and liabilities profile. To make it so, it is therefore neces-
sary to provide “entry gates” without respect for which no bonuses can be paid. 
The regulations do not deal with formalizing these gates, but by now it is nor-
mal practice among banks to refer to indicators of liquidity (e.g. level of coun-
terbalancing capacity, or of “readily liquidable assets”), assets and liabilities 
(among which CET 1 Ratio, Total Capital Ratio, Level of Absorbed Internal 
Capital) and performances (among others, result of business year net of ex-
traordinary components); the fixing of these indicators must be coherent with 
the levels of “risk appetite” and “risk tolerance” established preliminarily and 
passed by the Board, as well as with the bank’s strategic and operational plan-
ning documents8. 
When the conditions of access to bonuses are achieved and verified, 
the bank must make sure of the effective correlation with company perfor-
mance parameters9. In the calibration of such parameters there should of 
course be coherency between these measurements and the need for measuring 
an effective level of performance, as much as possible “normalized”, “stand-
ardized” and “risk adjusted”. 
All these forecasts have to do with so-called ex-ante risk adjustment, 
that is to say they are linked to the need for a functional bond between bonus 
and performance (direct link) and bonus and risks assumed (inverse link). But 
the regulations also and above all provide for elements of ex-post risk adjust-
ment aiming at guaranteeing that the links described are maintained over time. 
In this way going against managements which, though optimal in the short 
term inasmuch as they are suitable for increasing the value of performance 
indices (to which emolument is anchored: e.g. quotations or data of the bal-
ance) and thus maximizing the amount receivable, may not be so in the long 
term at all, involving an excessive assumption of risks (Laverty, 1996). 
                                                          
8 On the concept of risk appetite see AIFIRM documents (Associazione Italiana Financial and 
Industrial Risk Manager) (http://www.aifirm.it/il_risk_appetite_framework/), as well as the 
Bank of Italy Circolare N° 263 of 27th December 2006 and subsequent updates. 
9 The regulations suggest, as possible parameters of “connection with company perfor-
mances”, RORAC, RAROC and RARORAC. 
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With view then to aligning incentives with the long term interests of 
the bank, the financial instruments assigned to the most relevant personnel are 
subject, first of all, to a prohibition against selling (e.g. with lock-in clause) 
until an adequate period of time has elapsed (retention period), identified and 
defined by the bank on the basis of suitable criteria (Section III, Paragraph 
2)10. 
In line with the regulatory system previously in force, the deferment of 
the variable remuneration is moreover obligatory for a period between 3 and 
5 years and for a percentage of remuneration “between 40% and 60%”, with 
the purpose of guaranteeing effectiveness of the link between remuneration 
and long term results, and avoiding that management choices may be influ-
enced by speculative factors.  
The provisions concerning deferral take substance in the obligation to 
provide for malus clauses (meaning non-payment of all or part of the deferred 
variable remuneration on ascertainment of certain elements of risk) and for 
clawback (clauses for return of all or part of the variable remuneration already 
paid out); the intention is clearly to discourage opportunistic behaviour aimed 
at obtaining short term company results, harbinger of the manifestation of fu-
ture risks (the already mentioned short-termism) (Clementi et al., 2009). For 
schematization requirements the methods by which the bonuses in question 
are paid could also come under the forecasts of ex-post risk adjustment. And 
here lies the explanation of the provision for which at least half of the variable 
remuneration must be paid in shares (or other capital instruments) subject to a 
retention period of at least two years. In fact the rule, having defined the 
method of paying bonuses, also deals with definition of the means of exchange 
by which they are to be paid. These means of exchange are identified as those 
financial instruments that reflect company market values. The retention period 
would moreover guarantee that this collection is not univocally induced by 
short term observation, or worse still, influenced by speculative factors11. 
Then there are new items in comparison with the Provision of 30th 
March 2011 – Provision concerning policies and practices of remuneration 
                                                          
10 The rule variously defines the (minimum) duration of this retention period according to the 
category and characteristics of the intermediary: the minimum term is two years for the major 
banks and at least one year for the intermediate. This expectation, in comparison with the past 
when the period could be determined autonomously, limits the negotiating autonomy of the 
parties (the bank first and foremost) (Bentivegna, 2016). 
11 Instruments admissible as balancing (at 50%) of variable remuneration, paid by liquid funds, 
are dealt with in Delegated Regulation EU N° 527/2014 of 12th March 2014. It should also be 
remembered that the majority doctrine is in agreement on the fact that realignment of the 
manager’s interests, to be pursued (also) through suitable remuneration policies, must be im-
plemented not only with regard to the shareholder but also to the other stakeholders. Hence 
the requirement that balancing the quota of liquid remuneration funds should not be effected 
only through the granting of shares but also of other instruments admissible for the purpose. 
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and incentivizing in banks and banking groups, issued by the Bank of Italy12 
in relation to the proportion of remuneration having to do with the final mo-
ment of the work relationship, or the moment succeeding it. These are provi-
sions for early severance payments, better known as golden parachutes, and 
for discretional pension benefits. In both cases these particular benefits must 
be connected with company performances, subject to the period of deferral, 
and to the abovementioned malus and clawback clauses. The clear intention is 
to discourage opportunistic behaviour, also with manifestation of risks subse-
quent to the conclusion of the respective work relationships (or positions as 
company officers) by the beneficiaries of the abovementioned remuneration 
benefits. 
Lastly, the regulations envisage special obligations regarding the re-
muneration of particular company positions. The Chairman of the Organ with 
Function of Strategic Supervision (which is to say the chairman of the board 
of directors in the traditional or monistic system, or the chairman of the super-
visory council in the dualistic system) is for example subject to a twofold cap: 
his total remuneration cannot in fact exceed the fixed remuneration of the MD 
or the General Manager. Again, the Provision requires by rule the avoidance 
of incentivizing mechanisms for non-executive administrators (including the 
Chairman), while their use for members of the Board of Arbitrators is ex-
pressly forbidden, as indeed indicated in the Italian Civil Code. Heads of the 
functions of internal control (compliance, risk management and internal audit-
ing) may instead receive bonuses, as long as the latter do not exceed one third 
of fixed remuneration (reinforced cap) and as long as they are linked solely to 
objectives of company sustainability (cost containment, assets reinforcement) 
and never to performance objectives.  
On this point it is interesting to note how the Provision in question 
creates a close and coherent interconnection with prescriptions on the subject 
of “Company Governance” (Circolare 285, Update I of May 2014) and of 
“System of Internal Controls” (Circolare 263, 15th Update, today integrated 
into Circolare 285 itself) issued by the Bank of Italy in the same period.  
By way of example, just as the discipline of “Bank Governance” re-
quires that the Chairman of the Board of Directors should play a role of guar-
antor, the Provision limits the payment of a bonus, evidently freeing his remu-
neration from elements of performance which do not sit well with such a role. 
The same goes for the “non-executive” administrators, in keeping with the 
principle, of Anglo-Saxon derivation, which requires, in favour of the board 
dialectic and the balancing of powers internal to the corporate administrative 
organ, a dualism between executive directors (to whom are attributed manage-
ment authority, and therefore specific remunerations) and non-executive (for 
                                                          
12 With which Directive 2010/76/EU (CRD III) had been implemented. 
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whom, quite clearly, high bonuses would conflict with the role – exercised for 
example within governance committees – of high supervision over delegated 
management). In the same way the limitation of bonuses in favour of heads of 
internal control systems is coherent with that organizational balance which 
would have the functions in question, not by accident reporting directly to the 
board, as internal subjects deputised to control of company management 
through the concentric and stratified definition of internal control. And lastly, 
the prohibition of variable bonuses in favour of the members of the board of 
arbitrators is a matter of good sense, more than one of regulatory coherence. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
In the theoretical-regulatory picture delineated so far, the empirical 
analysis presented in this paper proposes to analyse and compare the remuner-
ation policies adopted, over a determined period, by a suitably selected sample 
of significant supervised subjects13. 
As stated above, it is a preliminary inquiry which, albeit with the in-
trinsic limitations related to sample size and to the reference period and con-
text, is aimed at obtaining a first result which will be followed by future re-
search efforts. 
To test the research hypothesis, the sample was selected considering 
the 3 “significant” Italian banks for total activity, as resulting from the defini-
tion as per article 2, points 16) and 22) of the framework regulations on the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In particular they are UniCredit S.p.A. 
(total assets between 500 and 1000 billion Euros), Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. (to-
tal assets between 500 and 1000 billion Euros) and Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena S.p.A. (total assets between 150 and 300 billion Euros) (ECB, 2017)14. 
                                                          
13 By “significant supervised subject” is intended a) a significant supervised subject in a mem-
ber State of the euro area, or b) a significant supervised subject in a participating member 
State not belonging to the euro area. By “significant supervised group” is intended a group 
supervised which is qualified as a significant supervised group in accordance with a decision 
by the ECB adopted on the basis of article 6, paragraph 4, or of article 6 paragraph 5, letter b) 
of EU Regulation N° 1024/2013 of the council of 15th October 2013, which attributes to the 
ECB special duties regarding policies on the subject of prudential supervision of credit insti-
tutes (regulation on SSM), Cf. OB L 287 of 29.10.2013, p. 63. The assessment of significance 
is based on criteria such as: the overall value of their activity, the importance of the economy 
of the country where they operate or in the EU as a whole, the scale of their trans-frontier 
activities, and whether they have requested or received public financial assistance from the 
European Stability Mechanism or from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
14 The selection criteria for the sample adopted in this paper is the same one utilized in analo-
gous sectorial studies, such as for example the one carried out by Mediobanca (thirteenth in-
vestigation of major international banks effected by Mediobanca for the year 2016), according 
to which, “to be part of the sample the companies must represent a significant share of the 
total aggregate of the balance assets of the respective economic area. This significant nature 
is defined by adding companies to the sample until their contribution exceeds one percent of 
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The periods of reference for the analysis are 2013 and 2015, which 
represent respectively the year before and the year after the Provision coming 
into force. 
 
Methodology 
In observation of the informative obligations as per Art. 123-ter of the 
TUF (Single Text on Financial Intermediation) and those deriving from the 
discipline issued for the banking sector, banks are obliged to publish a report 
on remuneration which illustrates the company’s policies regarding remuner-
ation of the members of the administration organs, of the general managers 
and of managers with strategic responsibilities. Such a report supplies an ade-
quate representation of each of the items comprising it, analytically illustrating 
remuneration paid during the reference business year by the company and by 
controlled or associated companies. 
That data used for drawing up this study have been gathered manually 
for each of the banks analysed, on the basis of the remuneration reports, of the 
reports on corporate governance, of the information sheets for the public (so-
called Pillar 3) and the minutes of the meetings for the years 2013, 2014, 2015 
and 2016. 
The results of the analysis, point by point, are shown below and find a 
synthetic representation in the tables at the end of this document. 
 
Results 
Relevant personnel 
‘Relevant personnel’, as defined by Circolare 285, includes “the cate-
gories of subjects whose professional activity has or may have an important 
impact on the bank or banking group’s risk profile”. 
In 2015 the population of the most relevant personnel was reviewed by 
the 3 sample banks, guaranteeing full respect for the regulatory provisions. 
The result of the assessment process for identification of the “material risk 
takers” led to the singling out, for the year 2015, of a total number of resources 
no less than five times greater than the pre-reform period (Table 2).  
 
Remuneration received and relationship between fixed and variable compo-
nent 
The tables from 1a to 1d show the fixed and variable remunerations 
paid on average to the organs of administration, control and management in 
the two reference periods. 
                                                          
the previous aggregate cumulative total of the balance assets; banks whose contribution is less 
than one percent of this aggregate are excluded”. 
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From he analysis it emerges that the remuneration of the MDs of the 
sample banks underwent a slight diminution (in fact the growth rate is equal 
to -8.64%). In particular the fixed remunerations decreased while there was an 
increase in bonuses (in this sense a strong augmenting of the fair value of re-
muneration represented by shares in capital). 
The remuneration of the Chairmen of the Boards instead increased for 
the Unicredit group and Monte dei Paschi di Siena, similarly the non-monetary 
benefits, whereas the remuneration of the Chairman of the Management Coun-
cil of Intesa San Paolo decreased (Table 1f). In any case, in conformity with 
the Supervisory Provisions on remuneration, that of the Chairman is less than 
the fixed remuneration received by the MD and the CEOs. 
Remuneration of the organs of control diminished while that of general 
managers and other management with strategic responsibilities were on the 
increase (Tables 1c and 1d). 
The limits were instead respected regarding the relationship between 
fixed and variable components of remuneration: all the sample banks remain 
within the 100% (with the exception of up to 200% for Unicredit and Intesa 
San Paolo for special categories of personnel). So the principle is now formal-
ized by which no member belonging to most relevant personnel may receive 
a bonus greater than the fixed quota of their remuneration; moreover, already 
prior to the Provisions in force the banks employed “shrewd” limitations to 
the incentivizing quota of remunerations (Table 3). 
 
Entry Gates 
The regulations establish that “subordination of bonus payment to ob-
jectives of company sustainability is admissible” (e.g. cost containment, rein-
forcement of capital etc.). To this end conditions of access to variable and not 
recurrent remuneration (so-called entry gates) are envisaged which prevent 
payment in whole or in part. 
The three banks analysed have prescribed, since before the recent reg-
ulatory update, limiting conditions for bonus payments, these tending to be 
subordinate to the achievement of minimum thresholds in terms of assets 
(Common Equity Tier 115), liquidity (Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable 
                                                          
15 The governing regulations regarding prudential requisites for credit institutes and invest-
ment firms is concerned with guaranteeing that financial intermediaries possess their own 
funds in sufficiency to absorb risks deriving from carrying out their activities. 
The general principle is: the greater the riskiness of the activity assumed, the greater the pos-
sessed funds must be. To this end: (i) own funds are classified in three categories: Common 
Equity Tier 1 or CET 1, Additional Tier 1 or AT1 and Tier 2 on the basis of their capacity to 
take part in the institute’s risks of loss; (ii) a minimum obligatory coefficient of own funds 
that the institute must possess is prescribed.  
Among the obligatory minimum coefficients, CET 1 consists of instruments of primary capital 
class 1, net of prudential filters and detractions.  
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Funding Ratio16) and profitability (absence of losses, or current positive result 
before Taxes). The thresholds vary for the 3 banks under consideration (Table 
4). 
In 2015 the threshold prescribed by the implementation rules for the 
bonus pool was reached in the case of the 3 banks under analysis. 
 
Malus and Clawback Mechanisms 
The variable component is moreover subject, on the basis of the regu-
lations in force, to ex-post correction mechanisms (malus and clawback) de-
signed, among other things, to reflect the levels of assets and performance net 
of risks effectively assumed (or undergone), as well as to take account of in-
dividual behaviour by personnel under survey. These mechanisms may there-
fore lead to reduction (or zeroing) of the variable remuneration itself, espe-
cially in the case of results significantly inferior to predetermined objectives. 
The banks then introduced indicators of a qualitative nature, linked to 
the conduct of personnel in the course of their work relationship (in general, 
cases of disciplinary measures for fraudulent behaviour or gross negligence by 
personnel, also taking account of profiles of a legal, national insurance and tax 
nature on the subject), which are specifically designed to activate the mecha-
nisms of clawback (return of already paid sums). 
From the analysis of company documents it emerged that, given the 
assets and performance levels achieved, and considering the behaviour of per-
sonnel during 2014, for the 3 sample banks it was not considered necessary to 
apply any of these mechanisms in 2015 (Table 5). 
 
Period of deferral 
As far as the periods of deferral are concerned, the regulations appear 
to have affected only the period of deferment envisaged for the most relevant 
personnel (increase from 3 to 5 years for the banks Intesa and MPS), leaving 
unvaried the provisions for non-relevant personnel. After the introduction of 
                                                          
The instruments of CET 1, in particular, are those capable of absorbing the first and greatest 
part of possible losses sustained by the institute of credit. The regulations therefore provide 
for a series of conditions that these instruments must respect from the formal and economic 
viewpoint to guarantee both this capacity and their stability over time (Rutigliano 2016). 
16 The new rules of prudential supervision established by Basel 3 envisage the calculation of 
two liquidity indicators and minimum limits to respect, equal to 100% of the indicator itself: 
a short-term indicator, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, and a structural indicator, the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio.  
The former is aimed at the establishment of a liquidity buffer that allows the bank to survive 
30 days of potential net cash outflows in stress situations, be they idiosyncratic (specific to 
the individual bank) or systematic (proper to the whole financial system). 
The latter aims instead to tackle structural unbalances in the composition of the assets and 
liabilities balance sheet over the timespan of one year (Rutigliano, 2016). 
European Scientific Journal March 2018 edition Vol.14, No.7 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
401 
the Provision, therefore, the variable compensation was deferred 5 years for 
executive directors, the general manager, the general co-managers, the general 
vice-managers (and other analogous figures), the heads of main business areas 
(and areas with greater risk profile, e.g. investment banking), company func-
tions or geographical areas, as well as those reporting directly to organs with 
functions of strategic supervision, management and control. Whereas for the 
others deferral it was 3 years (Table 6). 
 
Golden Parachute 
As regards remuneration agreed upon the event of early termination of 
the mandate or early resignation (so-called golden parachute), the new regula-
tions do not seem to have brought modifications of note. 
The trend, at least in recent years, is in fact to not envisage treatment 
in favour of administrators in the case of early termination of work relationship 
(Table 7). 
Whereas any agreements scheduled with Executive Managers are gov-
erned by the normal provisions of law (e.g. the individual contract as Manager 
signed by the Unicredit Group MD prescribes that the indemnity to be paid in 
the event of resignation or dismissal/revocation without just cause is consti-
tuted: (i) by the fixed remuneration, (ii) by every other remuneration of a con-
tinuative nature and (iii) by the average of variable remunerations paid over 
the last three years prior to termination.  
In the light of the results obtained, hypothesis H1) is therefore also 
confirmed: the regulations do not modify, except marginally, the banks’ re-
muneration and incentivizing systems. In fact, the most relevant modifications 
concerned the insertion of limits to the relationship between the fixed and var-
iable components of remuneration, the introduction of qualitative indicators 
linked to the conduct of personnel in the course of their work relationship, 
such as might trigger mechanisms of clawback, and, the forecast of a longer 
period of deferral of the variable component of remuneration, for the relevant 
personnel. 
 
Conclusion and possible further developments of the research 
As may be seen from the foregoing paragraphs, also after appropriate 
comparison with the tables below, the three main Italian groups turn out to be 
(i) in conformity with full application, since 2015, of the supervisory prescrip-
tions contained in the Provision; (ii) not particularly influenced, as regards the 
architecture of their remuneration system, by the regulatory innovations intro-
duced in 2014. The explanation for this phenomenon is traceable to multiple 
aspects, chiefly deriving from a general cultural approach of care and atten-
tion, by our country’s banking system, with regard to risk factors inherent in 
an unbalanced remuneration and incentivizing system. On this subject, the 
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banks analysed demonstrate how, as early as the business year 2013, their sys-
tems of paying top management were geared to a suitable balancing of the 
fixed and variable components of remuneration, as well as to cogent systems 
(ex-ante and ex-post) for adjustment of the latter. In truth, the Provisions is-
sued in 2014 and here examined follow” the conceptual itinerary of numerous 
previous Provisions issued by the Bank of Italy in earlier years (in particular 
the cited provision of 30th March 2011), thus seeking to implement a system 
of principles already in place. Nonetheless, by analysing the most innovative 
part of the provision, which is the part relating to the "cap" between fixed and 
variable remuneration, we note a greater moderation in the variable remuner-
ation of certain figures. Furthermore, the sample of selected banks was already 
in conformity regarding that which then became cogent with the new provi-
sions. In fact, as may be seen from the more precise disclosure reports on lim-
itation of bonuses as against payments of a fixed nature, they have, more than 
anything else, rendered obligatory a greater formalisation and standardisation 
of principles already accepted in the past. 
In this general framework the data of the three banks examined show 
a real effect produced by the new regulations: a widening of the perimeter 
enclosing subjects who may be qualified as “risk takers”. 
The results of the research presented here highlight some important 
profiles of governance of the leading banking groups. However, they suffer 
from the limitations indicated at the beginning, such as narrowness of the sam-
ple, the short period of reference and the absence of comparisons at European 
and international level. The research reported in this paper, as observed pre-
liminarily, should be considered introductory and preparatory to a broader re-
search design aimed at the so-called traditional generalization of results 
through a longitudinal type analysis, based on the variations in time of the 
same samples, or through consideration of wider ranging samples belonging 
to economic and cultural contexts different from our national one. 
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Year
Average Fixed 
Remunerations
∆%
Average 
Remunerations 
for participation 
in committees
∆%
Average Bonuses 
and other 
incentives
∆%
Average Share 
in profits
∆%
Average Non-
monetary 
Benefits
∆%
Average Other 
remunerations
∆% Total ∆%
Average Fair 
Value of equity 
remunerations
∆%
Average end of 
mandate or 
severance 
indemnity
∆%
2013 6,013,946.67 - 76,836.33 -  498,000.00 -  0.00 -  324,050.33 - 298,731.67 -  7,211,565.00 -  459,495.33 -  1,200,000.00 -
2015 5,151,908.00 -14.33 96,315.00 25.35 710,666.67 42.70  0.00 -  210,762.67 -34.96 418,777.00 40,19  6,588,429.33 -8,64  1,729,590.67 276.41 0,00 -100.00
Year
Average Fixed 
Remunerations
∆%
Average 
Remunerations 
for participation 
in committees
∆%
Average Bonuses 
and other 
incentives
∆%
Average Share 
in profits
∆%
Average Non-
monetary 
Benefits
∆%
Average Other 
remunerations
∆% Total ∆%
Average Fair 
Value of equity 
remunerations
∆%
Average end of 
mandate or 
severance 
indemnity
∆%
2013  2,011,318.67 -  38,066.67 -  0.00 - 0.00 -  13,125.67 -  36,738.00 - 2,099,249.00 -  0.00 -  0.00 -
2015  1,715,876.00 -14.69  0.00 -100.00  0.00 -  0.00 -  15,857.33 20.81  20,900.00 -43.11 1,752,633.33 -16.51  0.00 -  0.00 -
Year
Average Fixed 
Remunerations
∆%
Average 
Remunerations 
for participation 
on committees
∆%
Average Bonuses 
and other 
incentives
∆%
Average Share 
in profits
∆%
Average Non-
monetary 
Benefits
∆%
Average Other 
remunerations
∆% Total ∆%
Average Fair 
Value of equity 
remunerations
∆%
Average end of 
mandate or 
severance 
indemnity
∆%
2013  5,302,318.33 -  0.00 -  900,347.00 -  0.00 -  330,890.33 -  238,847.67 -  6,772,403.33 -  273,543.00 -  2,096,501.33 -
2015  5,960,209.00 12.41  0.00 -  1,606,541.67 78.44  0.00 -  519,823.67 57.10  431,947.33 80.85  8,518,521.67 25,78  3,633,092.00 1228.16  2,783,183.33 32.75
APPENDIX 
 
Tables 
 
1. Remuneration of high governance organs 
 
TABLE 1a — REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF BANK MANAGEMENT ORGANS (IN EUROS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1b — REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF BANK CONTROL ORGANS (IN EUROS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1c— REMUNERATIONS OF BANK MANAGERS WITH STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITIES (IN EUROS) 
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Year
Average Fixed 
Remunerations
∆%
Average 
Remunerations 
for participation 
on committees
∆%
Average Bonuses 
and other 
incentives
∆%
Average Share 
in profits
∆%
Average Non-
monetary 
Benefits
Average Other 
remunerations
∆% Total ∆%
Average Fair 
Value of equity 
remunerations
∆%
Average end of 
mandate or 
severance 
indemnity
∆%
2013  1,011,346.67 -  5,400.00 -  0.00 -  0.00 -  104,579.67 -  4,621.00 -  1,125,947.33 -  91,391.67 -  150,000.00 -
2015  1,155,334.67 14.24  0.00 -100.00  116,666.67 -  0.00 -  101,563.33 -2.88  97,031.67 1999.80  1,470,596.33 30.61  319,699.67 249.81  1,797,897.00 1098.60
Year
Emoluments passed 
by the meeting
Attendance 
allowances
Remunerations ex 
Art. 2389
Total Fixed 
Remunerations
Remunerations for 
participation on 
committees
Bonuses and other 
incentives
Non-monetary 
benefits
Other 
remunerations
Total
2013  161,000.00  21,200.00  1,375,000.00  1,557,200.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -199,671.00  1,357,529.00
2015  1,411,000.00  22,000.00  125,00.,00  1,558,000.00  0.00  0.00  12,906.00  10,792.00  1,581,698.00
Year
Fixed 
remunerations
Attendance 
allowances
Remunerations ex 
Art. 2389
Total
Remunerations for 
participation on 
committees
Bonuses and other 
incentives
Non-monetary 
benefits
Other 
remunerations
Total
2013 1,033,000.00  0.00  0.00  1,033,000.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 1,033,000.00
2015 900,000.00  0.00  0.00  900,000.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  900,000.00
Year
Fixed 
remunerations
Attendance 
allowances
Remunerations ex 
Art. 2389
Total
Remunerations for 
participation on 
committees
Bonuses and other 
incentives
Non-monetary 
benefits
Other 
remunerations
Total
2013  69,600.00  0.00  0.00  85,800.00  16,200.00  0.00  1,810.00  0.00  87,610.00
2015  326,889.00  0.00  0.00 337,153.00  10,264.00  0.00  3,896.00  0.00  341,049.00
TABLE 1d — REMUNERATIONS OF BANK GENERAL MANAGERS (IN EUROS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1e — REMUNERATIONS OF BOARD CHAIRMAN, UNICREDIT (IN EUROS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1f— REMUNERATIONS OF CHAIRMAN OF MANAGEMENT BOARD, INTESA (IN EUROS) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1g— REMUNERATIONS OF BOARD CHAIRMAN, MONTE PASCHI (IN EUROS) 
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2. Identification of highly relevant personnel (material risk takers)  
 
Year UNICREDIT INTESA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
2013 
The reference population represents around 0.1% of overall 
Group personnel 
110 26 
2015 
1100 (The reference population represents around 0.7% of 
overall Group personnel, a datum in line with the process re-
sults 2014) 
350 202 
 
 
3. Cap to variable remuneration quota 
 
Year UNICREDIT INTESA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
2013 
The incentivizing systems envisage maximum limits to vari-
able remuneration, whose target values are established by 
considering the defined pay-mix where maximum effective 
amount cannot exceed 150% of target value 
Limit to individual prize equal to 100% of gross annual re-
muneration 
Maximum limit of 500,000 euros to the overall Remunera-
tion of Top Management, starting from December 2013 
(post-Restructuration Plan 2013-2017) 
2015 
The maximum limit to variable remuneration was deter-
mined: 
• at 200% of fixed remuneration for business functions 
personnel; 
• at 100% for the rest of personnel, with the exception 
of personnel belonging to the control functions 
The maximum limit to variable remuneration was deter-
mined: 
• at 100% of fixed remuneration for roles not belonging 
to the Company Control Functions; 
• at 33% of fixed remuneration for roles belonging to 
the Company Control Functions 
The maximum limit to variable remuneration was deter-
mined: 
• at 100% of fixed remuneration for roles not belonging 
to the Company Control Functions; 
• at 33% of fixed remuneration for roles belonging to 
the Company Control Functions 
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4. Entry-Gates 
 
Year UNICREDIT INTESA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
2013 
Core Tier 1 Ratio ≥ 9%. 
Return on Tangible Equity ≥ 12.48% 
Group Net Profit < 0 
In the case of loss, zeroing of incentive is activated 
Cash Horizon ≥ 90 days 
All incentivizing systems for Group personnel are subordi-
nate to three types of conditions: 
1. Common Equity Tier Ratio at least equal to the limit en-
visaged in the RAF (Risk Appetite Framework); 
2. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) at least equal to the 
limit envisaged in the RAF; 
3. Absences of loss, or positive Current Result before tax 
(net of extraordinary elements/elements deriving from repur-
chase of own balance-sheet items) 
Single GATE:  
Group Consolidated Net Profit ≥ 50% of Budget value 
2015 
                                                                                    Net Op-
erating Profit adjusted ≥ 0;                                  
Net Profit ≥ 0;                                                                   
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio transitional ≥ 7%;                          
Cash Horizon ≥ 90 days 
All incentivizing systems for Group personnel are subordi-
nate to three types of conditions: 
1. Common Equity Tier Ratio at least equal to the limit en-
visaged in the RAF (Risk Appetite Framework); 
2. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) at least equal to the 
limit envisaged in the RAF; 
3. Absences of loss, or positive Current Result before tax 
(net of extraordinary elements/elements deriving from repur-
chase of own balance-sheet items) 
Common Equity Tier 1 > 10.2% 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio > 80% 
Profit Before Tax equal or superior to 85% of the budge 
The percentage of prizes made available is a function of the 
achievement percentages of a predefined Group Profit before 
tax objective 
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5. Malus/Clawback 
 
Year UNICREDIT INTESA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
2013 
CLAWBACK: applicable to performance linked incentives 
paid on assumptions later revealed to be erroneous; 
MALUS: in function of verification from time to time of the 
entry gates 
The company reserves the right to activate mechanisms of 
clawback, meaning return of prizes already paid, as required 
by the rules, in the case of disciplinary initiatives and provi-
sions envisaged in response to fraudulent conduct or gross 
negligence by personnel, further taking into account profiles 
of a legal, national insurance and tax nature on the subject; 
MALUS: function of verification from time to time of the 
entry gates 
PRESENT (but specifications not found) 
2015 
CLAWBACK: on shares and in general in variable remuner-
ations;  
MALUS: in function of verification from time to time of the 
entry gates 
The company reserves the right to activate mechanisms of 
clawback, meaning return of prizes already paid, as required 
by the rules, in the case of disciplinary initiatives and provi-
sions envisaged in response to fraudulent conduct or gross 
negligence by personnel, further taking into account profiles 
of a legal, national insurance and tax nature on the subject; 
MALUS: function of verification from time to time of the 
entry gates 
Reinforcement of assessments on the subject of adjustment 
mechanisms for ex-post risks (malus and clawback) through 
introduction of indicators of a qualitative nature linked to the 
conduct of personnel in the course of their work relationship; 
deferred component subjected to the mechanisms of malus;                            
mix of indicators that weigh in the deferred component (e.g. 
Tier 1, liquidity, etc.) 
 
6. Deferral period 
 
Year 
UNICREDIT INTESA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
Relevant Personnel Others Relevant Personnel Others Relevant Personnel Others 
2013 5 years 3 years 3 years 
For the “Extended Perime-
ter” a simpler method envis-
aged for deferral (lump sum 
after two years) 
3 years 3 years 
2015 5 years 3 years 5 years 3 years 5 years 3 years 
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7. Golden parachute and severance indemnity 
 
Year UNICREDIT INTESA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
2013 
For the Administrators there are no contracts containing clauses 
with payment of indemnity after termination of office or in the 
case of resignation or dismissal/revocation without just cause. In 
the case of early interruption of the mandate the normal legal pro-
visions are applied. 
The MD’s individual work contract as Manager is regulated by 
normal legal provisions and by the National Work Contract for 
Credit Managers of 10th January 2008 (renewed 29th February 
2012). In this context the annual remuneration considered in deter-
mination of any indemnity payable in the abovementioned cases 
would consist of fixed remuneration, of any other remuneration of 
an ongoing nature and of the average variable remunerations re-
ceived in the three years prior to termination. 
Observance of the principles of the 
Group Ethical code excludes the 
possibility of “golden parachutes” to 
managers and employees, intending 
thereby individual agreements 
signed ex-ante (or prior to the act of 
cancelling the work relationship) 
which discipline agreed remunera-
tion in the case of early termination 
of the relationship. 
In general, no treatment is envisaged in favour of administrators leaving 
office.  
Four (4) Top Managers benefit from a “guaranteed minimum duration” 
clause (3 years) by which in the case of withdrawal without just cause the 
Bank must pay them their gross annual remuneration (RAL) and the part 
of incentives matured for the residual period of the “guaranteed minimum 
duration” (with a minimum value of payment). 
For the General Manager there was the settlement agreement for prosecu-
tion of the work relationship under the conditions imposed by the Euro-
pean Commission (which in the case of dismissal without just cause pro-
vides for the differential amount between what has matured in virtue of the 
aforementioned minimum duration clause and a settlement sum of € 1.2 
million). 
2015 No relevant modification to the above 
24 Monthly payments of fixed remu-
neration, including indemnity for 
lack of notice 
In general, no treatment is envisaged in favour of administrators leaving 
office. For the General Manager the settlement agreement for prosecution 
of the work relationship is carried forward under the conditions imposed 
by the European Commission (which in the case of dismissal without true 
and just cause provides for the differential amount between what has ma-
tured in virtue of the aforementioned minimum duration clause and a set-
tlement sum of € 1.2 million). 
 
